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NAFTA's Rule of Origin and its Effect




If enacted,1 the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) would gradually eliminate 7000 tariffs, duties, and non-
tariff barriers between the United States, Canada, and Mexico.'
NAFTA would open trade between the second and third largest trad-
ing partners of the United States, Canada and Mexico respectively.3
NAFTA would result in the world's largest free trade area, encom-
passing approximately 363 million people and a gross national product
of $7.5 trillion.4
NAFTA's stated objectives include expanding trade between the
participating nations and increasing investment opportunities within
the free trade area.5 Mexico potentially has the most to gain from
1 See infra notes 39-43 and accompanying text for remaining procedural steps necessary for
NAFTA's enactment.
2 North American Free Tade Agreement, Sept. 6, 1992 [hereinafter NAFTA Draft #2]. (To
date, there have been two drafts of NAFTA released. Neither of these drafts have been enacted
into law).
3 United States' trade with Mexico and Canada represents 25 % of all United States' for-
eign trade. Trade between the United States and its neighboring countries has more than
doubled since 1980 to reach $234 billion. See Leaders Express Concern Over Stalled GATT,
Examine Trade Dynamics of Pacific Basin, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) (May 8, 1991).
4 The combined gross national product of NAFrA's free trade area is $1.4 trillion greater
than the European Economic Community's free trade area. See Peter Newman, Falling into
Bush's Mexican Trade Trap, MACLEAN'S, Aug. 17, 1992, at 30.
5 NAFrA's stated objectives are to: eliminate barriers to trade and facilitate cross-border
movements of goods and services, promote conditions of fair competition, increase investment
opportunities, provide adequate protection for intellectual property rights, establish effective
procedures for the implementation and application of the Agreement and for the resolution of
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NAFTA, as NAFTA would accelerate the pace of its movement to-
wards more open trade6 and secure its access to the expansive North
American market.7 The United States stands to increase its exports of
sophisticated products and services to Mexico, suppress the tide of il-
legal immigration, and increase its investment in Mexico.8 Canada's
interests in NAFrA appear more defensive, aimed primarily at pre-
serving its interests under the Canada-United States Free Trade
Agreement (CFTA).9
NAFTA has drawn particular attention in the automotive indus-
try since this industry is heavily dependent on international trade.10
NAFTA's provisions on automotive trade were heavily debated and
were among the last issues resolved in trade negotiations." In its cur-
rent form, NAFTA would enable automotive corporations to export
automobiles to the United States, Mexico, and Canada without incur-
ring tariff costs on automobiles deemed to originate in the NAFTA
region.12  By receiving preferential tariff treatment, qualifying auto-
motive corporations would be placed at a competitive advantage over
non-qualifying automotive corporations when exporting to the
NAFTA region.
disputes and to further trilateral, regional and multilateral cooperation. See NAFTA Draft #2
Art. 102.
6 See infra notes 28-38 and accompanying text for discussion of Mexico's recent movement
towards open trade.
7 For a discussion of the goals of each of the countries participating in NAFA, see Gary C.
Hufbauer & Jeffrey J. Schott, Options for a Hemispheric Trade Order, 22 U. MIr.M INTER-AM L.
Rnv. 261, 282 (1991).
8 IL at 282. President Bush stated that "By moving forward with NAFrA, we will
.... [open] ... up new horizons of opportunity and enterprise in the New World." The White
House, Office of Press Secretary, Statement by the President, Aug. 12, 1992 [hereinafter Press
Release].
9 U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-449,
102 Stat. 1859 (1988) [hereinafter CFTA] (this agreement substantially eliminates tariffs between
the United States and Canada).
10 Provisions related to automobiles were expected to receive substantial scrutiny by Con-
gress, even prior to NAFTA's signing. See NAFTA Should Contain Plans for Bi-National Infra-
structure Commission, Kolbe Says, Int'l rade Rep. (BNA) (May 27, 1992). Mexico's chief
negotiator, Herminio Blanco, noted the importance of NAFTA on the automotive industry, stat-
ing that "the auto sector, of course, is a very important sector in these negotiations ..... We
believe that an agreement can be negotiated.. .which will strengthen the industries that we have
in our three countries [and make them] more able to compete in the global market place."
NAFTA Negotiators Struggle With Rule of Origin for Autos, Int'l rade Rep. (BNA) (Aug. 29,
1992).
11 NAFTA Negotiatiors Struggle With Rule of Origin for Autos, supra note 10.
12 See NAFTA Draft #2, ch. 4; see also part IV, infra, for discussion of NAFTA's rule of
origin requirement.
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The determination of an automobile's place of origin for treaty
classification purposes, however, is frequently unclear. Even
automobiles that are fully assembled in one country generally contain
several parts that are manufactured throughout the world. While past
free trade agreements ("FTAs") have utilized rule of origin require-
ments to determine the origins of automobiles, rule of origin require-
ments have not always led to predictable results.13
The problems surrounding the use of rule of origin requirements
were recently highlighted when the United States Customs Service
ruled that certain automobiles assembled by Honda in Canada and
exported to the United States did not satisfy CFTA's rule of origin
requirement.14 The United States Customs Service concluded that
certain of these automobiles did not possess a sufficient amount of
content manufactured in the treaty region ("domestic content") to
qualify for preferential tariff treatment.15 The executive vice presi-
dent of Honda, Scott Whitlock, stressed that this interpretation was in
direct conflict with an earlier interpretation by the customs service of
Canada. 6 The Minister of International Trade and Industry in Japan,
Kozo Watanabe, expressed concern that the United States might be
using the ruling to discriminate against foreign firms.' 7
Under the ruling, Honda was ordered to pay penalties for past
unpaid tariffs which former United States Trade Representative, Carla
Hills, estimates could exceed $16 million.' 8 The extent of these dam-
ages, as well as the sharp disagreement over their applicability illus-
trate the importance of having clear and predictable rule of origin
requirements.
This comment will specifically address how NAFTA's rule of ori-
gin requirement will affect the North American automotive industry.
To provide a thorough understanding of this topic, this comment will
(1) discuss how NAFTA evolved and detail the remaining procedural
steps necessary for its enactment; (2) briefly discuss the current North
American automotive industry; (3) compare and contrast rule of ori-
gin requirements under previous FTAs; and (4) analyze NAFTA's
13 See infra part HI. B. for a discussion of rule of origin requirements used under previous
FIAs.
14 See United States International Trade Commission, 1992 rrC Lexis 195, Apr., 1992; Cus-
toms Rules That Canadian Honda Civics Failed to Meet Content Standard Under FTA, Int'l Ilade




18 See Lindsay Chappel, Honda has big incentive to back new trade treaty, AuTroMoriv
NEws, Sep. 14, 1992, at 33.
NAFTA's Rule of Origin
14:442 (1994)
proposed rule of origin requirement and its potential effects on the
North American automotive industry.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Definition and Purpose of Free Trade Agreements
FTAs are forms of preferential trade liberalization in which two
or more nations eliminate or substantially reduce trade barriers
amongst themselves. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
("GATT"), which regulates trade amongst nations,19 defines FTAs as
agreements under which participants remove tariffs and "other re-
strictive regulations on commerce ... on substantially all the trade
between themselves. 2 °
FTAs are generally seen as an effort to improve efficiency in in-
ternational trade. FTAs allow participating countries to maximize
economies of scale by concentrating their production efforts in areas
in which they are most efficient, while trading with other participating
countries for their remaining needs absent tariff costs.
B. Evolution of NAFTA
The concept of dismantling trade barriers and thereby opening
trade is consistent with the United States' notion of a free market sys-
tem. The United States has been engaged in extensive free trade with
other countries since GAIT was enacted in 1947.21 Presently the
United States has FTAs with both Israel22 and Canada.23
The enactment of a FTA between the United States and Mexico,
however, involves unique obstacles since the relationship between the
19 GATT has been described as "at the same time a legal framework for the conduct of trade
relations between its member countries, a forum for trade negotiations and for the adaptation of
its legal framework, and an organ for conciliation and settlement of disputes. It is modified
sometimes in its structure and its modus operandi so as to adapt to the economic and political
conditions in which world trade develops." OLIVER LONG, LAW AND rrs LIMrrATONS IN THE
GAIT MULTLATERAL TRADE SySmM 5 (1985).
20 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Article XXIV, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 para. 8(b) (1947)
[hereinafter GATT].
21 GAT'T governs the trade of over 100 countries. For an overview of GATT, see generally
LONG, supra note 19, at 4-6.
22 24 I.L.M. 653 (1985) [hereinafter Israel-United States Free-Trade Agreement]. See gener-
ally Ira Nikelsberg, The Ability to Use Israel's Preferential Trade Status With the United States and
the European Community to Overcome Potential Trade Barriers, 24 GEG. WASH. J. INT'L L. &
ECON. 371 (1990); but see Roundtable Discussion: The North American Free Trade Agreement: In
Whose Best Interest?, 12 Nw. . INT'L L. & Bus. 536, 538 (noting that the Israel-United States
Free Trade Agreement is not of great economic importance).
23 See CFTA, supra note 9.
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two countries has been strained by a troubled history.24 Tensions be-
tween the two countries stem back to 18475 and have continued into
the present.26 Unlike the open economic policies that the United
States and Canada share, which helped lead to the enactment of
CFTA, Mexico's economic policies traditionally have been closed to
avoid the perceived threat of economic domination by the United
States.27
In the past few decades, however, Mexico has moved towards a
more open trade policy. In 1965, Mexico adopted the Maquiladora
program, which to a limited extent allows foreign corporations to es-
tablish operations in Mexico and export part of their production with-
out incurring full tariff costs.28 General Motors, Chrysler, and Ford
each participate in the Maquiladora program.29 In 1982, Mexico's
debt crisis forced the government of Mexico to further reconsider its
protectionist stance. 0 Mexico began to dismantle its trade barriers,
and in 1986 joined GATT.
24 See Alejandro Ogarrio & Leonel P. Castro, Mexico-United States Relations: Economic In-
tegration and Foreign Investment, 12 Hous. J. INr'L L. 223, 226 (1990) (noting past strained
relations between Mexico and the United States).
25 Mexico has experienced poor relations with the United States originating back to 1847
when United States invaded Mexico City and annexed Texas as a state. The United States then
forced Mexico to sell its interests in what is now California, Nevada, Utah, Arizona, and New
Mexico. See ROBERT R. MILLER, MnXsco: A HIsTORY 229 (1985).
26 "A variety of issues-immigration, narcotics trafficking, foreign investment, trade, and for-
eign policy (especially relating to Central America) have generated a barrage of rhetoric and
negative reaction between both nations." Ambassador Abelardo L. Valdez, Strengthening the
United States-Mexico Relation: A Proposal for Establishing a Free-Trade Zone and Co-Produc-
tion Zone, 18 CALIF. W. INT'L L. J. 65, (1987-88).
27 Statement by Dr. Alejandro Carrillo Castro, Consul General of Mexico that "we Mexicans
tend to think of our northern neighbor as a very powerful and sometimes dangerous neighbor in
economic and political terms." See Roundtable, supra note 22, at 542. Mexico has relied on
import substitution policies, restrictions on foreign investment, and a controlled exchange rate in
an attempt to foster domestic growth and establish self sufficiency. See Press Release, supra
note 8; Jesus Silva & Richard K. Dunn, A Free Trade Agreement Between the United States and
Mexico: The Right Choice?, 27 SAN DIEoO L. Rv. 937 (1990) (analyzing Mexican attitudes
towards foreign investment).
28 The original Maquiladora program focused primarily on border development. The pro-
gram allowed foreign corporations to export products and avoid paying tariffs on raw materials
imported as part of the manufacturing process. See generally Cheryl Schechter & David Brill,
Maquiladoras: Will the Program Continue?, 23 ST. MARY's LJ. 697 (1992). "U.S. manufacturers
using the maquiladoras, for example, may import raw materials, equipment and components
duty-free from the United States to produce goods for sale back home. The U.S. Customs Ser-
vice assesses duty only on the value added in assembly or manufacture in Mexico." Kevin G.
Hall, NAFTA May Spur Maquiladoras To Move Inland, Officials Say, J. OF COM., Dec. 3,1992, at
9C.
29 Schechter & Brill, supra note 28.
30 During the early 1970s, Mexico's discovery of large oil deposits in a period of global oil
shortage enabled the country to secure numerous foreign loans. However, due to rising interna-
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Under the current leadership of President Salinas, the pace of
Mexico's movement towards more open trade has quickened.3' Presi-
dent Salinas has encouraged the open trade movement by issuing a
more expansive Maquiladora decree,32 encouraging the privatization
of certain public enterprises,3 3 controlling the value of the Mexican
peso,34 increasing Mexico's efforts to curb drug trafficking,35 and en-
acting tougher environmental laws. 6 During this time, the United
States' exports to Mexico have more than tripled to an estimated $44
billion in 1992,37 and several trade agreements have been reached be-
tween the two countries.3
tional interest rates and declining oil prices, Mexico's $6.1 billion of foreign debt in 1970 esca-
lated to $81 billion in 1982. This led the administration of President de la Madrid to conclude
that Mexico's long standing protectionist stance was ineffective. U.S. Libr. Cong., Cong. Res.
Services, Rep. No.1B91061, Mexico-U.S. Relations in the Salinas Period (1988-1994): Issues for
Congress 5 (Dec. 3, 1991).
31 See Press Release, supra note 8.
32 See generally Schecter & Brill, supra note 28 (noting changes made to the Maquiladora
program from 1965 to 1992). Unlike the original Maquiladora Decree, which was passed primar-
ily to promote Mexican labor, the new decree allows goods produced in the Maquiladora pro-
gram to be sold in Mexico. Silva & Dunn, supra note 27, at 259.
33 See Mexico: State Run Telephone Company to Go Private, With Foreign Investment Lim-
ited to 23 Percent, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) (Sept. 20, 1989), at 1198; Louis Uchiteile, Going
Private is a Very Public Affair, N.Y. Tums, Aug. 25, 1990, at 33.
34 President Salinas has acted to reduce the pace of the devaluation of the Mexican peso
against the United States dollar. See New Leader Drops Freeze on Prices, Wages, and Currency,
N.Y. TiMEs, Dec. 12, 1988, at D1.
35 See Mexico Tough on Drugs, L.A. DAILY J., Jan. 3, 1990, at 6; U.S. Mexico Set Anti-Drug
Pact, WASH. POST, Aug. 9, 1990, at Al; US-Mexico Relations, U.S Department of State, Bureau
of Public Affairs, Office of Public Communication, July 31, 1992 [hereinafter Relations Report]
(noting that the Salinas administration has increased Mexico's effort to curb drug trafficking by
increasing the funds allocated to drug control in Mexico from $37 million in 1989 to $77 million
in 1991).
36 See Daniel I. Basurto Gonzalez & Elaine Flud Rodriguez, Environmental Aspects of the
Maquiladora Operations: A Note of Caution for U.S. Parent Corporations, 22 ST. MARY'S LJ.
659,678-80 (1991) (noting Mexico's recent cooperation with the United States on environmental
control issues); Relations Report, supra note 35 (noting that in 1992 President Bush and Presi-
dent Salinas released a plan to deal with U.S.-Mexico border pollution problems, with Mexico
committing $460 million to the project); but see NAFTA may Bring Import of Pollution to Mex-
ico, J. OF CoM., Aug. 20, 1992 (noting Mexico's more lenient stance towards environmental
issues).
37 See Relations Report, supra note 35. Exports of consumer goods tripled during this same
period to $3.4 billion and exports of capital goods more than doubled. The White House, Office
of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet, The North American Free Trade Agreement for Immediate
Release, Aug. 12, 1992.
38 These agreements include the Framework Understanding on Bilateral Trade and Invest-
ment 27 I.L.M. 438 (1988) (establishing a framework for future bilateral trade negotiations be-
tween Mexico and the United States and setting up a mechanism to work out trade disputes), the
Textile Agreement (1988), 27 I.L.M. 451 (1988) (providing Mexican-made textiles greater access
to American markets), the Understanding Regarding Trade and Investment Facilitation Talks
(1989), 29 I.L.M. 36 (1990) ("expanding consultations under the Framework Understanding to
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 14:442 (1994)
Building on the momentum of the improved relations and in-
creased trade between the United States and Mexico, as well as the
recent enactment of a FTA between the United States and Canada,39
the negotiations for NAFTA proceeded with unprecedented speed.40
After fourteen months of confidential negotiations, the three coun-
tries agreed to sign NAFTA on August 12, 1992,41 and actually signed
the agreement on December 17, 1992.42 However, NAFTA becomes
effective only if enacted by each country's respective legislature, and
future modifications are uncertain.43
C. Structure of the North American Automotive Industry
The automotive industry is critical to the maintenance of the
American and Canadian economies,44 and has shown growing impor-
tance to the Mexican economy.45 The automotive industry is the larg-
include negotiations on market access and trade and investment facilitation in product areas and
interrelated issues"), the Understanding Regarding the Joint Committee for Investment and
Trade (1989), 29 I.L.M. 40 (1990) (promoting trade and investment opportunities between the
United States and Mexico), the Agreement on the Development and Facilitation of Tourism
(1989) 29 I.L.M. 42 (1990) (facilitating tourism between Mexico and the United States), and the
Tax Information Exchange Agreement, 29 IL.M. 50 (1990) (preventing tax evasion and fraud).
39 See CFTA, supra note 9.
40 Former U.S. Trade Ambassador, Carla Hills testified before the Subcommittee on Trade
that from the time President Bush and Salinas first took office, the progress of trade negotiations
went far beyond initial expectations. United States-Mexico Economic Relations: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Trade of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 47, 49
(1990); See also Carla A. Hills, America's Free Trade "Firsts", J. OF CoM., Aug. 14, 1992, at 8A
("Never before has such an ambitious trade negotiation been accomplished so quickly"). On
June 10, 1990, President Bush and President Salinas issued a joint statement endorsing the idea
of a comprehensive free trade agreement between the United States and Mexico. See Key Points
in NAFTA Negotiations to Date (White House Press Release), Aug. 1992. Partially in a defen-
sive move to maintain its established trade relation with the United States under CFTA, Canada
announced its intention to join the negotiations soon thereafter. Id.
41 See North American Free Trade Agreement, Aug. 12,1992 [hereinafter NAFTA Draft #1].
42 See John Maggs, Bush, Mulroney Salinas Sign North America Trade Accord, J. OF CoM.,
Dec. 18, 1992, at 3A.
43 Id. President Clinton's stated concerns over NAFTA focus on environmental and employ-
ment issues. See Bill Clinton, Expanding Trade and Creating American Jobs, 23 ENvrv. L. 683
(1993); AFL-CIO, Other Unions Blast Free Trade Pact as Prescription for U.S. Job Loss, Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) (Aug. 13, 1992). A ruling handed down on June 30, 1993 by a U.S. district
court judge in Washington could delay the NAFTA implementation. The ruling requires a full
evaluation of the NAFTA's environmental impact. See Brenda Dalglish, Setback: NAFTA at
Risk, MACLEAN'S, July 12, 1993 at 30.
44 See generally Competitiveness of the North American Automotive Industry: Report of the
U.S.-Canada Automotive Select Panel at 7 (1992) [hereinafter Competitiveness Report] (On file
with author).
45 The Mexican automotive industry is growing rapidly in terms of both production and sales.
See Rules of Origin Issues Related to NAFTA and the North American Automotive Industry,
Report to the Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. House of Representatives, on Investigation
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est manufacturing sector in the American and Canadian economies,
accounting for over four percent of GDP and approximately 1.2 mil-
lion jobs.46 In 1990, over 11 million automobiles were produced in
North America. The United States and Canada produced 9.6 million
and 1.9 million automobiles respectively, 47 and Mexican output stood
at approximately 821,000.48
The American and Canadian automotive industries are domi-
nated by the American-owned automotive corporations of General
Motors, Ford and Chrysler ("the Big Three"), which operate approxi-
mately fifty assembly plants in the United States and ten in Canada.49
This dominance, however, recently has been challenged by foreign-
owned automotive corporations.5 0 The American and Canadian auto-
motive market is subject to few trade regulations 51 which has helped
foreign-owned automotive corporations, such as the Japanese, to cap-
ture nearly twenty-eight percent of the total North American automo-
tive market.52 In recognition of these growing figures, Japanese-
No. 332-314 Under Section 332 of the Tariff Act of 1930 at 14 [hereinafter Rule of Origin Re-
port]. Mexico accounted for record sales of 614,823 cars and trucks in 1991. See VW Sees Gains,
Risks in Mexican Free Trade, Au-roMo-vE NEws, Aug. 31, 1992, at 35.
46 See Competitiveness Report, supra note 44, at 8.
47 Competitiveness Report, supra note 44, at 8. For a good discussion of automotive trade in
the United States and Canada, see Shelly P. Battram & Blake Murray, The United-States-Canada
Free Trade Agreement and North America Automotive, 494 PLI/CoMM (1989).
48 Competitiveness Report, supra note 44, at 8. For a good discussion of automotive trade in
Mexico, see GARY C. HuFBAUER & JEFFREY J. ScHo-r, NoRnm AmmuCAN FREE TRADE: Is-
SUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS, 213 (1992).
49 General Motors, Ford and Chrysler accounted for 35.5%, 23.9% and 12.2% respectively of
the United States' automobile market in 1990 and 34.8%, 20.8% and 15.3% respectively of Can-
ada's automobile market in 1990. See Rule of Origin Report, supra note 45, at 9.
50 The market share of North American automotive manufacturers declined from 83% in
1978 to 56% in 1991. Id.
51 The United States and Canada are two of the most open countries for automotive trade.
The most favored rate of duty for passenger automobiles is 2.5% ad valorem. The most favored
rate of duty for passenger automobiles imported into Canada is 9.2% ad valorem. Tariffs be-
tween the United States and Canada are being phased out under CFTA. There is a voluntary
restraint agreement between Japan and the United States limiting imports of Japanese
automobiles to 2.3 million units, however, imports have generally exceeded this amount. See
Rule of Origin Report, supra note 45, at 13.
52 This amount is based on 1990 figures and includes production in America by foreign-
owned automotive producers. See James B. Treece, War, Recession, Gas Hikes.. .GM's Turn-
around Will Have to Wait, BusiEss WEEK, Feb. 4, 1991, at 104. The four largest foreign auto-
mobile producers in America in 1990 were Toyota, Honda, Nissan, and Mazda with 7.6%, 6.2%,
4.5% and 2.5% share of the automotive market respectively. In Canada the largest foreign auto-
mobile producers in 1990 were Honda, Toyota, Mazda, Nissan, and Volkswagen with 7.8%,
7.2%, 3.2%, 3.0%. 2.8%, and 4.5% share of the automotive market respectively. See Rule of
Origin Report, supra note 45, at 9.
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owned automotive corporations53 and automotive parts corporations
5 4
have shifted a significant number of their production plants to North
America. At present, there are approximately 500 foreign-owned au-
tomotive related corporations operating in North America.55
Mexico's automotive industry bears little resemblance to the au-
tomotive industry in the United States or Canada.5 6 Mexico's auto-
motive industry is entirely foreign-owned, consisting solely of eight
automotive plants owned by Volkswagen, Nissan, General Motors,
Ford and Chrysler.57 While these plants tend to be older and less effi-
cient than those in the United States and Canada,5 Mexico's restric-
tive trade policies have helped to protect these plants from outside
competition.59 Mexico's recent trade liberalization, however, has ena-
bled the United States to double its automotive exports to Mexico in
the past three years.60 The Mexican automotive market is the fastest
growing market in the Western Hemisphere and promises to be a fer-
tile ground for automotive trade expansion in the near future.61
53 As of 1990, 1,496,748 and 215,970 automobiles were produced in America and Canada
respectively by foreign owned automotive producers. Honda had the most automotive produc-
tion with 433,317 automobiles produced in America and 103,781 in Canada. See Rule of Origin
Report, supra note 45, at 10.
54 Rule of Origin, supra note 45, at 10.
55 Rule of Origin, supra note 45, at 10.
56 For a good discussion of the automotive industry in Mexico, see HUFBAUER & ScHOTr,
supra note 48, at 234-41.
57 ld.; See Max Gates, Free Trade Talks in Mexico to Work Out Vehicle Pact, AUTOMOTIVE
NEws, July 27, 1992.
58 Id.
59 Mexico's current tariff is 20% ad valorem on imported automobiles and 10-13% ad
valorem on auto parts. Under the Mexican Automotive Decree, auto producers must maintain a
trade surplus in Mexico such that for each dollar's worth of automobiles sold in Mexico the
automotive producers have to generate $2 in exports. Mexico limits automotive imports to 15%
of automotive sales, increasing to 20% in 1993. Mexico limits foreign investment in the automo-
tive parts industry to 40% equity participation and requires at least 36% Mexican content in
automobiles that are manufactured in Mexico. See Rule of Origin Report supra, note 45, at 14.
60 See supra part II.B. for discussion of Mexico's movement towards open trade. In the past
three years U.S. exports of auto parts to Mexico have amounted to 5.4 billion a year. This has
resulted in the first automotive parts trade surplus with Mexico since the U.S. has been monitor-
ing trade. See Lindsay Chappell, Suppliers Welcome More Access; Trade Group Sees More Ex-
port Sales, AtrroMo-xvE Naws, Aug. 17, 1992, at 35. Nonetheless, by American and Canadian
standards, the Mexican automotive market is still highly protective. For a discussion of Mexico's
automotive trade liberalization, see North American Free Trade: Issues and Recommendations,
supra note 56, at 213.
61 See Roger W. Wallace & Max Scoular, The North American Free Trade Agreement and
United States Employment, 24 ST. MARY's LJ. 945 (1993).
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D. NAFrA's Provisions Relating to the Automotive Industry.62
NAFTA includes various provisions which specifically address the
North American automotive industry.63 Automotive export tariffs
among NAFTA parties will be completely eliminated within ten years,
although phase-out schedules will differ among Mexico,' Canada,65
and the United States.66 Tariffs on automotive parts would be largely
reduced within five years of NAFTA's enactment.67 Each of the par-
ticipating countries would be able to review the effectiveness of
NAFrA on the automotive sector to determine whether additional
actions should be taken to improve the integration and international
competitiveness of the sector.68
NAFTA also calls for the modification of existing automotive
trade regulations in Canada,69 the United States,70 and Mexico.7  The
most significant modifications relate to the Decree for Development
and Modernization of the Automotive Industry of 1989 ("Mexican
62 A detailed analysis of the rule of origin requirement under NAFTA is provided in Section
IV of this comment. See infra notes 103-16 and accompanying text.
63 See NAFTA Draft #2, Annex 300-A: Trade and Investment in the Automotive Industry
Sector (this section of NAFTA specifically addresses automotive trade).
64 For imports from Canada and the United States, Mexico will: (1) immediately reduce tar-
iffs on passenger automobiles by 50%, with the remaining tariffs being eliminated within ten
years; (2) immediately reduce tariffs on light trucks by 50%, with the remaining tariffs being
eliminated in five years; (3) eliminate all other tariffs within ten years. NAFTA Draft #1, at 8.
65 Canada will eliminate its tariffs on the same schedule as Mexico. NAFTA Draft #1, at 8.
66 Tariffs on imports from Canada were eliminated under CFTA. Under NAFTA, imports
from Mexico will be treated as follows: (1) tariffs on all passenger automobiles will be immedi-
ately eliminated; (2) tariffs on light trucks will be immediately reduced to 10% and eliminated
within five years; and (3) all other tariffs on other vehicles will be eliminated within 10 years
after NAFTA's enactment. NAFTA Draft #1, at 8.
67 NAFTA Draft #1, at 8.
68 NAFTA Draft #2, Annex 300-A para. 2. (This review would have to occur no later than
Dec. 31, 2003).
69 Canada would continue to be able to operate under the Auto Pact entered into between
Canada and the United States in 1966, which calls for the elimination of tariffs on automotive
trade and CFTA. NAFTA Draft #2, Annex 300-A.1 para. 1. Certain new restrictions would be
placed on Canada's ability to limit importation of used vehicles from Mexico. See generally
NAFTA Draft #2, Annex 300-A.1 para. 4.
70 The most significant modification would be that the United States would be required to
amend the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975 ("CAFE"), 42 U.S.C. § 6201 et seq., to
permit existing manufacturers beginning in 1997 to count Mexican content and production as
domestic content of the United States towards CAFE standards. This would have a significant
impact as it would allow United States automotive producers an additional option in structuring
the sourcing requirements to meet CAFE standards. See generally NAFTA Draft #2, Annex 300-
A.3.
71 See generally NAFTA Draft #2, Annex 300-A.2. These modifications focus on the existing
Mexican Automotive Decree, the auto parts industry in Mexico, national value added require-
ments, and trade balance requirements.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 14:442 (1994)
Automotive Decree"), which restricts foreign automotive investment
in Mexico.72 Under NAFTA, a modified Mexican Automotive Decree
would remain in effect until 2004.73 The modified Mexican Automo-
tive Decree would reduce current value added restrictions,74 and re-
quire automobiles manufactured in Mexico to contain at least thirty-
four percent Mexican content, falling to twenty-nine percent in 2003.75
The modified Mexican Automotive Decree would phase out the cur-
rent trade balance restrictions, which restrict the number of vehicles
that a manufacturer may import into Mexico in relation to the total
number of vehicles that the manufacturer sells in Mexico.76
III. ANALYSIS AND PURPOSE OF RULE OF ORIGIN REQUIREMENTS
A. Definition of Rule of Origin Requirements
Rule of origin requirements are regulations that govern the deter-
mination of the country of origin of an imported product under FTAs.
Rule of origin requirements are an attempt by FTA members to cap-
ture most of the benefits of the FTA for themselves. The main focus
of these requirements is to prevent trade deflection. That is to pre-
vent firms from countries outside the free trade region from simply
being able to assemble their final products in one area of the free
trade region so that they could qualify for preferential tariff treatment
on exports to other areas of the free trade region. For example, under
CFTA's rule of origin requirement, Honda was unable to qualify for
preferential tariff treatment since its automobiles did not possess suffi-
cient domestic content, even though its automobiles were assembled
in Canada.7 7
Rule of origin requirements generally have been expressed in one
of the following four forms: (1) a change of tariff heading test, which
focuses on whether a certain product has undergone sufficient
processing in a country covered under the treaty to warrant a change
in its tariff classification;78 (2) a value added content standard, which
focuses on whether a certain product contains sufficient "local con-
72 For an explanation of the Mexican Automotive Decree see supra note 59.
73 NAFTA Draft #2, Annex 300-A.2 para 1.
74 See supra note 59.
75 NAFTA Draft #2, Annex 300-A.2.
76 NAFTA Draft #2, Annex 300-A.2 paras 12-16.
77 See supra note 14 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Honda ruling.
78 For an example of a change of tariff heading test, see infra note 103 and accompanying
text, discussing "tier one" of NAFrA's rule of origin requirement.
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tent" to be afforded the benefits of the free trade agreement;79 (3) a
critical process requirement, which requires that certain processes be
conducted in the free-trade area;80 or (4) combinations of the above.81
As global automotive trade increases, the importance of rule of
origin requirements will also increase. Due to the international link-
ages and the technical complexities, the automotive industry has al-
ways been a difficult industry in which to apply rule of origin
requirements. In such context, a predictable rule of origin require-
ments is imperative to enable automotive producers to properly plan
and structure their operations to avoid massive penalties associated
with negative custom rulings.
B. Rule of Origin Requirements Under Previous FTAs
To understand the potential impact of NAFTA's rule of origin
requirement on the North American automotive industry, it is helpful
to examine rule of origin requirements included in previous FTAs.
1. The Substantial Transformation Test
The traditional rule of origin requirement employed in the
United States is the "substantial transformation test." While no stat-
ute or regulation specifically defines the substantial transformation
test, it has received considerable attention from the courts. The
Supreme Court, first articulated this standard in Anheuser-Busch
Brewing Ass'n v. United States.83 This case held that a product pos-
sessing content manufactured from outside the free trade area must
undergo sufficient manufacturing in the free trade area so that it
emerges as a new and different article, having a distinctive name,
character, or use to qualify for preferential tariff treatment. 4
79 For examples of value added content standards see infra notes 91, 95 & 107 and accompa-
nying text, discussing certain aspects of the rule of origin requirements under Israel-United
States FTA, CFrA and NAFrA.
80 This standard is currently used in the European Community, but it is opposed by most
North American automobile manufacturers because it reduces sourcing flexibility. Rule of Ori-
gin Report, supra note 45, at 2.
81 See infra note 103 and accompanying text discussing NAFrA's utilization of the change in
tariff heading test and value added content standard.
82 This comment discusses the (1) substantial transformation test, (2) the rule of origin re-
quirement under the Israel-United States Free Trade Agreement, and (3) the rule of origin re-
quirement under CFrA. While this discussion is sufficient to lay the necessary groundwork for
this comment, readers interested in additional analysis should see N. David Palmeter, Rules of
Origin or Rules of Restriction? A Commentary on a New Form of Protectionism, 11 FoRDHA"
INT'L LJ. 1 (1987).
83 207 U.S. 556 (1908).
84 1l. at 562.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 14:442 (1994)
While this standard certainly has some strengths, it would not be
an appropriate standard to determine the origin of automobiles under
NAFTA. Even though the substantial transformation test is flexible
enough to accomodate the constantly evolving automotive industry,
has been applied for numerous years, and involves no record keeping
responsibilities, it has been criticized for not providing predictable re-
sults." In considering whether a particular good satisfies the substan-
tial transformation test, courts have focused on varying factors
including whether the imported product had lost its original identity, 6
whether the good was transformed from one used primarily by produ-
cers to one used primarily by consumers,87 whether significant value
was added to the product, 8 and whether the production process was
significantly complex.89 The lack of objective criteria used in adminis-
tering this test would hinder automotive producers' ability to properly
plan their complex, long term operations.
2. Israel-United States Free Trade Agreement
The ambiguities noted in the substantial transformation test were
considered when formulating the rule of origin under the Israel-
United States Free Trade Agreement. The rule of origin under this
FTA provides more objective criteria by requiring that a certain per-
centage of a product's contents be manufactured in the free trade area
to qualify for preferential tariff treatment.90 This rule of origin speci-
fies that the sum of the costs of material produced in Israel, including
85 Several commentators have noted that the old "substantial transformation" test was
plagued with confusion and contradictions. See Paul Asker, Changes in the Rules of Origin in the
United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement: A Preliminary Evaluation, 36 WAYNE L. REv. 1545,
1549-52 (1990); C. Edward Galfand, Heeding the Call for a Predictable Rule of Origin, 11 U. PA.
J. INT'L Bus. L. 469 (1989); Palmeter, Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement Rule of Origin
and a Multilateral Agreement, 16 INr'L Bus. LAW. 513, 514 (1988) (noting international pressure
to abolish the substantial transformation test).
86 See, e.g., United States v. Gibson-Thomsen Co. 27 C.C.P.A. 267 (1940) (substantial trans-
formation occurs when imported products are so processed that they lose their individual iden-
tity and become part of a new product "hav[ing] a new name, character and use").
87 See, e.g., Midwood Indus. v. United States, 313 F. Supp. 951, 957 (Cust. Ct. 3d 1970) (sub-
stantial transformation occurs when processing alters an article from one primarily used by a
producer to one used by a consumer).
88 See, e.g., United States v. Murray 621 F.2d 1163, 1169 (1st Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
837 (1980) (addition of significant value and significant production costs result in a substantial
transformation).
89 See, eg., Texas Instruments, Inc. v. United States 681 F.2d 778 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (assembly
process may be viewed as substantial transformation if it is complex and requires further
processing or transformation).
90 This rule is based upon those provided in the Caribbean Basin Initiative with minor modi-
fications. Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L. No 98-573, § 402(a)(1), 98 Stat. 3015 (1988).
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the direct costs of processing operations performed there, must ex-
ceed thirty-five percent of the estimated value of the merchandise to
qualify for preferential tariff treatment.91
This rule of origin, however, would not be acceptable for gov-
erning the origin of automobiles under NAFTA. While certainly there
is no "magic" percentage at which to set the domestic content thresh-
old requirement, the thirty-five percent figure is too low. This figure
would enable automotive producers from outside the NAFTA region
to exploit NAFTA and circumvent tariff costs. Non-NAFTA parties
would be able to qualify for preferential tariff treatment simply by
assembling automobiles in the free trade area from a majority of for-
eign produced parts. Although one of the primary goals of any free
trade agreement is to dismantle trade barriers, this goal must be bal-
anced with the goal of preserving the benefits of a FTA primarily for
the FTA members. 2 Considering the unique international competi-
tion which is already plaguing the North American automotive indus-
try,93 it is imperative to provide some protection for domestic
automotive producers.
3. The Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement 94
CFTA's rule of origin requirement addressed the aforementioned
problem by raising its domestic content requirement to fifty percent of
assembly costs.95 In calculating this amount, CFTA utilizes the "direct
cost method," which requires fifty percent of the value of originating
materials plus costs of processing be produced domestically.96 Direct
costs are limited to direct labor, materials and processing costs. 97 This
is a significant provision, as it removes manipulative costs such as
overhead and advertising from the calculation, leading to more pre-
dictable customs rulings.
91 ME at Annex 3 para. 1(c). This provision, however, does not specifically cover automotive
trade.
92 See supra part II.A., noting the importance of preserving the benefits of a FTA solely for
its participating members.
93 See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
94 While the following discussion of CFTA is sufficient to establish the foundation for this
comment, a more detailed discussion is provided in the Rule of Origin Report, supra note 45.
95 United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No.
100-449, § 202(c)(3), 102 Stat. 1851, 1857 (1988); Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement,
27 I.L.M. 281, 306 (1988).
96 Id
97 Direct costs include all costs associated with labor, inspection and testing of goods, energy
and fuels, machine maintenance and depreciation, development and engineering costs, rent, and
royalty or licensing fees. Id at § 202(f)(3)(A-F), 102 Stat. at 1859; 27 I.L.M. at 296.
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CFTA utilizes the "roll up" method to calculate domestic content
of automotive parts that consist of materials manufactured throughout
the world. This method considers an automotive part to originate in
the country that accounts for the majority of its content. For example,
if a given automotive part possesses more/less than fifty percent do-
mestic content, its entire costs will be counted as domestic/foreign. 9
While in theory the "roll up" method should have a zero sum
gain, this method may be manipulated to skew domestic content cal-
culations.99 For example, if an automotive part which is shipped from
Canada to the United States possesses domestic content valued at
$501 and foreign content valued at $499, its entire cost of $1,000
would be considered domestic. If the part is then combined in the
United States with another foreign produced part valued at $900 and
then re-enters Canada, its entire cost of $1,900 would be considered
domestic even though the "true domestic content" is only worth $501.
Some commentators claim that this type of manipulation was at-
tempted by Honda and is now the focus of its recent customs
dispute. 100
As such, even though CFTA's rule of origin raises the content
requirement from past FTAs and eliminates various costs that could
be subject to manipulation such as promotional expenses, it would not
be the optimum rule of origin to govern automotive trade under
NAFTA. As evidenced by the Honda ruling,101 the rule of origin
under CFTA has proved to be ambiguous and has been inconsistently
applied by customs officials.' 02
IV. RULE OF ORIGIN REQUIREMENT UNDER NAFTA
A. Overview
The primary concern in negotiating NAFTA's rule of origin re-
quirement was to limit non-NAFTA parties from simply assembling
their products in one area of the treaty region and receiving preferen-
98 If, however, a given component contains less than the 50 percent content requirement, the
entire component is considered foreign made. Id.
99 Id.
100 See Paul Magnusson & James B. Treece, Honda, is it an American Car?, BUSiNESS WEEK,
Nov. 18, 1991, at 107.
101 See supra notes 14-18 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Honda dispute.
102 See Rule of Origin Report, supra note 45, at 75 (the primary problem with the CFrA's rule
of origin is its complexity); Strict Origin Rules Could Result in NAFTA Benefits Being 'Obliter-
ated' Conference Told, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) (June 3, 1992) (Toyota Motor Sales official, Rob-
ert Wade, noting language problem of CFTA, stating that it is not simple, clear, and easy to
administer).
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tial tariff treatment on exports to other areas of the treaty region.
NAFTA contains a stringent and detailed rule of origin requirement
to prevent such trade deflection and to provide clear and predictable
origin rulings. Products exported into the treaty region that do not
satisfy the rule would be subjected to continued tariff application.
While NAFTA's rule of origin requirement continues to apply
several of the concepts adopted under CFTA, there have been some
substantial modifications. Under NAFTA's rule of origin require-
ment, automotive goods would be subject to a two tier test. The first
tier is applicable to all goods imported into the treaty region.103 This
tier considers whether a given article has undergone enough process-
ing in the free trade region to be deemed to originate from the re-
gion."e Articles wholly obtained or produced entirely in the territory
of one or more of the parties clearly satisfy this test.'05 A more com-
plicated situation is when the article consists of a number of foreign
parts or consists of parts produced in a NAFTA country from third
world raw materials. In this situation, the foreign parts must be sub-
stantially transformed in the NAFTA region so as to undergo a speci-
fied change in tariff classification.106
103 The first tier is provided as follows in NAFA Draft #2 Art. 401:
"Except as otherwise provided in this Chapter, a good shall originate in the territory of aPart where:
a( the good is wholly obtained or produced entirely in the territory of one or more of
the parties, as defined in Article 415;(b) each of the non-originating materials used in the production of the good undergoes
an applicable change in tariff classification set out in Annex 401 as a result of pro-
duction occurring entirely in the territory of one or more of the Parties, or the good
otherwise satisfies the applicable requirements of that Annex where no change in
tariff classification is required, and the good satisfies all other applicable require-
ments of this Chapter,
(c) the good is produced entirely in the territory of one or more of the Parties exclu-
sively from originating materials; or
(d) except for a good provided in Chapters 61 through 63 of the Harmonized System,
the good is produced entirely in the territory of one or more of the Parties but one
or more of the non-originating materials provided for as parts under the Harmo-
nized System that are used in the production of the good does not undergo a change
in tariff classification because:(i) the good was imported into the territory of a Party in an unassembled or disas-
sembled form but was classified as an assembled good pursuant to General Rule
of Interpretation 2(a) of the Harmonized System, or
(ii) the heading for the good provides for and specifically describes both the good
itself and its parts and is not further subdivided into subheadings, or the sub-
heading for the good provides for and specifically describes both the good itself
and its parts, provided that the regional value content of the good determine in
accordance with Article 402, is not less than 60 percent where the transaction
value method is used, or is not less than 50 percent where the net-cost method
is used, and that the good satisfies all other requirements of this Chapter."
104 See supra note 78 and accompanying text describing the change in tariff heading test.
105 NAFTA Draft #2 Art. 401(a).
106 NAFTA Draft #2 Art. 401(b); See Annex 401 for specific change of tariff classification
requirements.
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The second tier, which is specifically applicable to automotive
trade, adds a regional value content requirement expressed as a per-
centage of the automobile's total value.10 7 This tier calls for an even-
tual increase in the necessary domestic content level of an automobile
from the fifty percent figure provided in CFTA, to sixty-two and one
half percent for passenger automobiles and light trucks 08 and sixty
percent for other vehicles.'0 9
Regional value content is calculated using the "net-cost"
method,110 in contrast to CFTA's "direct cost" method."' The net-
cost of an automobile equals the automobile's total cost less the costs
of: marketing, royalties, shipping, packing, and certain non-allowable
interest costs. 1 2 To qualify for preferential tariff treatment, the net-
cost of an automobile minus the value of the automobile's materials
manufactured outside the NAFrA region must exceed sixty-two and
one half percent of the automobile's net-cost." 3
The value of automotive parts from outside the NAFTA region
will be traced through the production chain in calculating the domes-
tic content of automotive goods ("trace through method"),"' in con-
trast to using the CFTA's "roll up" method." 5 Specifically, the "trace
through method" requires "the value of non-originating materials
used by the producer in the production of the good shall be the sum of
the values of non-originating materials, determined.... at the time the
non-originating materials are received by the first person in the terri-
tory of a Party who takes title to them." 116
107 NAFTA Draft #2, Art 403 & 402(3).
108 NAFTA Draft #2, Art. 403 5(a).
109 NAFTA Draft #2, Art. 403 5(b).
110 NAFTA Draft #2, Art. 402 5(d)(i).
111 See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
112 NAFTA Draft #2, Art. 402(8) & Article 415 (definition of net cost).
113 NAFrA provides a formula to determine regional value content of a good as follows:
RVC = NC-VNMINC x 100.
RVC = regional value content
NC = net cost of the good
VNM = value of non originating
materials used by the
producer in the production
of the good.
Id at Art. 402(3). Note: the 62.5% content figure is only applicable once NAFTA is fully
implemented.
114 NAFTA Draft #2, Art. 403(1)(a). Note, although the word "tracing" is not used in the
Agreement, its practical effect calls for such tracing.
115 See supra note 98.
116 NAFTA Draft #2, Art. 403(a).
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B. The Effect of NAFTA's Rule of Origin Requirement on the
North American Automotive Industry
As expected, NAFTA's rule of origin requirement drew substan-
tial attention from the automotive industry.117 While NAFTA in-
creases the domestic content requirement from past FTAs in an
attempt to preserve NAFFA's benefits solely for the participating
countries, American-owned automotive corporations initially com-
plained that NAFTA's content requirement was not set high enough.
American-owned automotive corporations fear that the sixty-two and
one half percent content requirement may enable foreign-owned au-
tomotive corporations operating in either Mexico or Canada ("trans-
plant corporations") to avoid tariff costs and flood the United States
with their imports." 8  At a minimum, some American-owned auto-
motive corporations desired a threshold requirement of sixty-five per-
cent domestic content.119
Unlike the government of the United States, the governments of
Canada and Mexico both desired a lower domestic content require-
ment. Canada and Mexico do not share the same concern as the
United States regarding outside automotive competition since each
country's automotive industry is predominately foreign-owned. 120
Their primary concern is to attract foreign-owned automotive corpo-
rations to establish production facilities in their respective coun-
tries.' 2' The lower the domestic content requirement under NAFTA,
the more apt foreign-owned automotive corporations that desire to
export duty-free to the United States would be to shift some of their
production facilities to either Mexico or Canada, as re-tooling costs
would be limited.122
Foreign-owned automotive corporations operating in Canada
have critized NAFTA's rule of origin requirement, claiming that it cre-
117 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
118 As stated by Chamber of Commerce economist, Debra Reinhart "U.S. auto makers don't
want Mexico [or Canada] being used as a trampoline for imports." See Trade in Auto Parts, Rules
of Origin Likely to be Major Issues in NAFTA Talks, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) (July 10, 1991).
119 See U.S. Car Makers Cautiously Back NAFTA, But Say They Want to See Details, Int'l
Trade Daily (BNA) (Aug. 18, 1992).
120 See supra notes 49, 57 and accompanying text.
121 'The International Automobile Manufacturers of Canada noted that the 62.5 percent con-
tent requirement would discourage foreign investment in the Canadian automotive sector. See
Canadian Reaction to NAFTA is Divided, Political Fight Over Approval is Expected, Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) (Aug. 19, 1992).
122 See infra notes 131-32 and accompanying text for a discussion of re-tooling costs.
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ates a "Fortress North America". 23 Specifically, these corporations
complain that the rule of origin's provisions are too stringent and vio-
late the free trade spirit of GAIT.12 4 GATT provides that FTAs are
permissible as long as they do not erect additional trade barriers. 25
While any rule of origin requirement by definition is a barrier to trade
since it discriminates against foreign produced goods, 26 it does not
necessarily create an additional trade barrier. Generally since foreign
produced goods never received preferential tariff treatment prior to
the enactment of a FTA, FTAs simply tend to preserve the tariff status
of these products and do not erect any additional trade barriers.
NAFTA's rule of origin requirement, however, arguably does im-
pose an additional trade barrier.12 7 Under CFTA, transplant corpora-
tions currently can export tariff-free from Canada to the United States
if their automobiles contain a minimum fifty percent domestic con-
tent. NAFTA seems to add an additional trade barrier by eventually
increasing the domestic content requirement to sixty-two and one half
percent for such exports. Moreover, the institution of the trace
through method closes the aforementioned loop hole available under
CFTA's roll up method, which currently enables content level manip-
ulations.128 Depending on the actual application by customs officials,
it is currently unclear whether this increase is substantial enough to be
deemed violative of GATT.
Even if the rule is not deemed to violate GATT, it most likely will
still burden transplant corporations operating in Canada. Existing
transplant corporations, such as Toyota, Honda and Suzuki export up
123 See Japan Seeks Assurance That NAFTA Will Not Affect GA7T Obligations, Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) (Aug. 19, 1992).
124 1d. Japanese officials argue that FTAs are only permissible if they expand free global
trade, and the stringent local content requirements are a "giant step in the wrong direction." See
Japanese Transplants Decry Increase in Content Levels; Costly Changes in Tooling Needed, Au-
TOMOTIVE Naws, Aug. 17, 1992, at 34.
125 GATT, Article XXIV, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 (1947).
126 A United States Treasury Department official and Chief Rule of Origin Negotiator, John
Simpson, noted that rules of origin have always been used for discriminatory purposes. See Strict
Rules Could Result in NAFTA Benefits Being 'Obliterated,' Conference Told, Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) (June 3, 1992).
127 James M. Sheehan, Not Quite Free Trade, J. OF COMM., Nov. 30, 1992, at 10A. "The North
American Free Trade Agreement is free trade in name only. Its 2,000 pages of rules and fine
print are aimed at achieving the opposite: managed trade. The treaty contains several provisions
that protect interest groups from competition in order to build political support. The main
mechanism the agreement uses to protect favored constituencies is the rule of origin, an indus-
trial policy device that restricts trade in certain products that are not manufactured in North
America.. .If applied to all products, rules of origin would be widely recognized as protectionist;
when applied to a few select industries, they are called "keeping America competitive".
128 See supra part II.B.2.
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to eighty percent of their output to the United States duty-free under
CFTA.12 9 If NAFTA's rule of origin requirement hinders the ability
of these transport corporations to continue to export duty-free to the
United States, it is conceivable that they will begin to shift their opera-
tions to produce directly in the United States,130 or limit their produc-
tion in North America altogether.
In particular, Japanese-owned automotive corporations operating
in Canada may be hindered by a stringent rule of origin requirement.
Japanese-owned automotive corporations place substantial emphasis
on maintaining long term relationships with a limited number of auto-
motive parts suppliers."3 As NAFTA marks the second time in five
years that the content rules for automobiles sold in North America
have changed,'32 NAFTA could greatly strain these supplier relation-
ships and result in expensive re-tooling costs.
Despite NAFTA's rule of origin requirement's increase in domes-
tic content level over that set forth in CFTA, the governments of Can-
ada and Mexico eventually supported the rule. This is largely
attributable to the influence the Big Three had in NAFTA negotia-
tions. 33 It is important to remember that the Big Three not only
dominate automotive trade in the United States, but also dominate
such trade in Canada and Mexico. 34 It appears that the governments
of Canada and Mexico were more concerned with maintaining posi-
tive relations with the Big Three than gaining investment from Asian
or European-owned automotive corporations. 135
129 See Japan Seeks Assurance That NAFTA Will Not Affect GATT Obligations, supra note
123.
130 The president of the Association of International Automobile Manufacturers of Canada,
Don McArthur, stated that higher content figures will result in increased foreign investment in
the United States. He noted that Toyota Canada and other foreign manufacturers are currently
looking to the United States for their expansion plans. Canada May Accept U.S. Auto Proposal
In NAFTA for 60 Percent Content Rule, Int'l Trade Daily (BNA) (June 10, 1992).
131 Unlike the average American-owned automotive corporation that typically has estab-
lished relations with thousands of automotive suppliers, Japanese-owned automotive corpora-
tions typically have relationships with as few as 200 to 300 automotive suppliers. See Rule of
Origin Report, supra note 45, at 11.
132 William Duncan, executive director of the Japanese Automobile Manufacturers Associa-
tion, stated that "Changing a critical factor like content level amounts to changing the rules in
the middle of the game." See U.S. Car Makers Pleased With NAFTA; Japanese Makers Predict
Higher Costs, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) (Aug. 19, 1992).
133 See David Crane, Experts Raise Doubts About NAFTA, TORONTO STAR, Feb. 23,1993, at
C2 (noting influence of the Big Three).
134 See supra notes 49-59 and accompanying text.
135 Automotive part suppliers from each of the three countries supported an increased do-
mestic content requirement as they stand to profit from such an increase by increased demand.
See Chappell, supra note 60, at 35; John Watling, Parts of the Pie, Auto Parts Manufacturers See
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To best serve these somewhat conflicting constituencies, NAFTA
was negotiated to also provide some protection for existing transplant
corporations operating in Canada. NAFrA's higher content require-
ment will be reached only by gradually increasing the content level set
forth in CFTA. NAFTA's content requirement will remain at fifty
percent until 1998 and will not be raised to sixty-two and one half
percent until the year 2002.136 To attract new investment, there is an
even greater delay for automobiles produced in the free trade region
in newly constructed automotive plants. 37 This transition period
should allow ample time for transplant corporations operating in Can-
ada to re-tool without substantially interrupting their current
operations. 38
Moreover, while NAFTA's rule of origin requirement will indeed
eventually be twelve and one half percent higher than that provided in
CFTA's rule of origin requirement, 39 the manner in which domestic
content is calculated under NAFTA has been substantially modified
from CFTA to provide new protection for transplant corporations cur-
rently operating in Canada.140  First, NAFTA's use of the trace
through method should result in more accurate content calculations.
Under this method, both the actual domestic and foreign content in
the automotive part would be counted in determining origin, in con-
Dollar Signs, BusiaNss MExaco, Nov. 1992. The Canadian Auto Workers also supported a high
domestic content requirement to avoid job displacement from increased operations in Mexico.
See Jeremy Sinek, Free-Trade Deal Wins Friends, Foes in Canada, AUTOMOTIVE NEWS, Aug. 24,
1992, at 24.
136 These increases will be phased in over a transition period, ending January 1, 2002. For
passenger automobiles and light trucks the content level would be 50% initially, increase to 56%
on January 1, 1998, and increase to 62.5% on January 1, 2002 and remain at that level thereafter.
For other vehicles and automotive parts the content level would be 50% initially, increase to
55% on January 1, 1998, and increase to 60% on January 1, 2002 and remain at that level there-
after. NAFTA Draft #2, Art. 403(5).
137 See NAFTA Draft #2, Art. 403(6) (a), providing that the 50 percent content rule shall apply
for automobiles produced in a plant that consists of a new building in which the motor vehicle is
assembled and the plant contains substantially all new machinery that is used in the assembly of
the motor vehicle.
138 The president of the Automotive Parts Manufacturers' Association of Canada, Neil
DeKoker noted that NAFrA's phase-in period should give foreign-owned automotive plants
operating in Canada adequate time to re-tool to meet NAFrA's increased content requirements.
See Lindsay Chappell, Japanese transplants decry increase in content levels; Costly Changes in
Tooling Needed, AuTOMoTIVE NEws, Aug. 17, 1992, at 34.
139 See supra note 136.
140 See NAFTA Negotiators Struggle With Rules of Origin for Autos, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA)
(April 29, 1992) (statement by a chief NAFTA negotiator that the manner in which the rule of
origin requirements are calculated is of equal importance to the content level requirement in
determining a rule of origin requirement's effects on a given industry).
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trast to the roll up method used under CFTA.141 Automobiles with
numerous automotive parts possessing just under fifty percent domes-
tic content would now get credit for their domestic content, which
could result in an increase of overall domestic content by approxi-
mately three to four percent for certain automobiles. 42 Most impor-
tantly, this more accurate calculation will lead to more predictable
customs rulings, thus better enabling automotive corporations to plan
their operations.
Second, NAFrA's net-cost method' 43 provides more protection
to transplant corporations operating in Canada than CFTA's direct-
cost method. 144 In attempting to protect the American automotive
market, the United Auto Workers ("UAW") lobbied for the direct-
cost method, which relies on a set of calculations to build up the cost
of the automobile in calculating the domestic content. 45 By building
up the domestic costs of an automobile, the direct-cost method con-
centrates solely on the actual North American manufacturing costs,
whereas the net-cost method may include various indirect costs, such
as indirect labor and overhead costs." The UAW insisted that if the
net-cost method was used, the content level should be no lower than
seventy-five percent to protect American automotive corporations. 47
Third, NAFTA's rule of origin provides more flexibility than the
rule of origin under CFTA. In calculating the content level of a motor
vehicle, automotive corporations may elect to average the automo-
bile's content over an entire product line or over an entire class of
automobiles.' 4 As such, foreign-owned automotive corporations will
141 See supra part IM.D. describing the roll up method, and notes 114-16 and accompanying
text describing the trace through method.
142 See Chappell, supra note 138, at 34. Note, however, the trace through method may also
lower the domestic content of certain automobiles that possess several component parts with just
over 51 percent domestic content.
143 See supra notes 112-13 and accompanying text.
144 See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
145 See U.S Car Makers Pleased With NAFTA; Japanese Makers Predict Higher Costs, Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) (Aug. 19, 1992).
146 See NAFTA Draft #2, Art. 408.
147 Statement by UAW president, Owen Bieber. See U.S Car Makers Pleased With NAFTA;
Japanese Makers Predict Higher Costs, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) (Aug. 19, 1992).
148 NAFTA Draft #2, Art. 403(3). "[For the purposes of] calculating regional value content of
a motor vehicle. . ., the producer may average its calculation over its fiscal year, using any one of
the following categories, on the basis of either all motor vehicles in the category or only those
motor vehicles in the category that are exported to the territory of one or more of the other
Parties:
(a) the same model line of motor vehicles in the same class of vehicles produced in the same
plant in the territory of a Party;
(b) the same class of motor vehicles produced in the same plant in the territory of a party;
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be able to increase the domestic content level of certain automobiles
simply by strategically structuring their content calculations.
In fact, the protections afforded by these calculation modifica-
tions are so significant that several commentators claim if NAFTA is
enacted that the recent ruling of the Customs Service of the United
States against Honda would be reversed. 4 9 Under the trace through
method, Honda would be allowed to retroactively count certain costs
that Customs had previously excluded under CFTA's roll up method.
Components that were previously considered fully foreign under
CFrA's roll up because they possessed more than fifty percent foreign
content, would now be given credit for their domestic content. More-
over, under NAFTA's net-cost method some costs excluded from con-
sideration under the CFTA's direct cost method, such as indirect labor
costs, would be included.' A reversal of this ruling would set an
important precedent for other similarly situated automotive
corporations. 5
NAFTA also provides certain limited exceptions to existing trans-
plant corporations operating in Canada. NAFTA provides a limited
exception to CAMI Automotive, Inc. ("CAMI"), 52 a joint venture
between Suzuki and General Motors of Canada Ltd. that produces
approximately 200,000 vehicles annually. 53 Under the CAMI clause,
CAMI products can be averaged together with General Motors' other
Canadian-made vehicles to determine an average United States-Can-
ada content level.' 5 Since most of General Motors' products contain
(c) the same model line of motor vehicles produced in the territory of a Party; or
(d) the basis described in Annex 403.4."
149 "At Canada's insistence, the new rules [of origin] are being drafted so that automobiles
produced at Honda's factory in Alliston, Ontario will qualify as made in North America." See
Keith Bradsher, North American Trade Talks Focus on Car Parts, N.Y. Timas, Aug. 8,1992, at 8.
"The new content rules would be precisely what Canada needs to avoid a return of the U.S.
Customs Service ruling against Honda Canada." Canada May Accept U.S. Auto Proposal in
NAFTA for 60 Percent Content Rule, Int'l Trade Daily (BNA) (June 10, 1992).
150 See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text for a discussion of such costs; see also David
Everett, Proposed Trade Pact to Benefit Honda, DETorr FREE PRn.ss, Aug. 14, 1992, at 1E;
Customs Rules That Canadian Honda Civics Failed to Meet Content Standard Under FTA, Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) (March 4, 1992) (noting controversy over the valuation of engines under the
CFIA's roll up method and whether certain employee health care expenses should be consid-
ered in the domestic content calculation).
151 See Honda Ruling, supra notes 14-18, and accompanying text.
152 NAFTA Draft #2, Annex 403.3.
153 See Lindsay Chappell, GM Suzuki get break on trade content, AurOMOTrIVE NEWS, Sep.
28, 1992, at 36.
154 NAFTA Draft #2, Annex 403.3(1) "For purposes of Article 403, in determining whether
motor vehicles produced by CAMI Automotive, Inc. ("CAM") in the territory of Canada and
imported into the territory of the United States qualify as originating goods, CAMI may average
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more than ninety percent North American content, the averaging is
almost certain to enable CAMI products to satisfy NAFTA's rule of
origin requirement. 55
The greatest impact on the North American automotive market
stems from Mexico's inclusion in NAFTA. If NAFTA is enacted, as
has similarly occurred with the enactment of CFTA, 56 foreign owned
automotive corporations would consider establishing operations in
Mexico to avoid tariff costs on exports to the United States. In fact, in
some instances, transplant corporations would be more apt to estab-
lish operations in Mexico than Canada, since Mexico offers the advan-
tage of substantially reduced labor rates.'57 This could lead to a
decrease in automotive investment in Canada from transplant corpo-
rations relocating their existing or restricting their future investments
to Mexico.
Similarly, American-owned automotive corporations would be in-
dined to shift a significant portion of their automotive production fa-
cilities to Mexico, both to take advantage of lower labor rates and to
consolidate their automobile production lines. 158 This has already
been seen to a limited extent through the Big Three's participation in
the Maquiladora program. 59 If Mexico's automotive demand contin-
ues to grow as expected,'160 these corporations would be further in-
its calculation of the regional value content of a class of motor vehicles or a model line of motor
vehicles produced in a fiscal year in the territory of Canada by CAMI for sale in the territory of
one or more of the Parties with the calculation of the regional value content of the correspond-
ing class of motor vehicles or model line of motor vehicles produced in the territory of Canada
by General Motors of Canada Limited."
155 See Chappell, supra note 153, at 36.
156 See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
157 The combined benefits and wages for a Mexican automotive worker equals a little more
than two dollars an hour. See Harley Shaiken, Mexico's Poorly Paid Workers Are as Highly
Skilled as Their U.S. Counterparts, L.A. DAILY J., May 29, 1991, at 6. This wage disparity be-
tween the U.S. and the Mexican auto workers is similar to the disparity of the Japanese and the
Mexican hourly rate. Mary Ann Maskery, Free trade in the West threatens auto jobs in Japan,
AUTOMoTIVE NEWS, Sep. 7, 1992, at 42.
158 "The Big 3 face the prospect of consolidating redundant production. That will be expen-
sive at first, but should pay off over time." Lindsay Chappell, Trade Pact to Force Hard Choices,
AurroMoTpvE NEws, Aug. 24, 1992, at 4.
159 See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
160 "Mexico has about 75 cars for every 1,000 people... And with Mexico's economic house
apparently in order, demand for cars can only grow with free trade." See Max Gates, Trade pact
sets offera of opportunity, AtrroMoTrvE NEws, Aug. 17, 1992, at 1. Automotive trade accounts
for one-fifth of trade between Mexico and the United States and is predicted to grow when
Mexico's remaining trade barriers are lifted. John Maggs, Auto Trade Poised for Rapid Accelera-
tion, J. OF COMM., Dec. 3, 1992, at lC.
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clined to establish operations in Mexico to better serve this growing
market. 161
This shift towards establishing production facilities in Mexico,
however, would proceed slowly. Access to lower labor rates alone
would not trigger an immediate shift in production to Mexico. If low
labor rates were the most important reason for selecting a production
site, Haiti would likely be the most industrious nation in the world.
Mexico's weak infrastructure,'162 low worker productivity, and remain-
ing trade regulations, particularly the Mexican Automotive Decree, 163
serve as significant obstacles to shifting automotive operations to
Mexico.
During this transition period, American-owned automotive cor-
porations should be in a better position to penetrate the Mexican au-
tomotive market than foreign-owned automotive corporations. In
contrast to American-owned automotive corporations that currently
produce automobiles with high domestic content, foreign-owned auto-
motive corporations would have to incur substantial re-tooling costs to
meet NAFTA's stringent rule of origin requirement.
Mexico's low labor rates' 64 would also serve to increase the bur-
den imposed by the origin requirement. Since the Mexican labor rates
are substantially less than those in the United States or Canada, an
equal number of labor hours performed in Mexico as compared to the
United States or Canada would produce a smaller effect on domestic
value calculations. The local content requirement posed by the Mexi-
can Automotive Decree, 65 would also serve as a barrier.
Moreover, unlike several of the foreign-owned automotive corpo-
rations,'166 each of the American-owned automotive corporations al-
ready has established production plants and supplier relations in
Mexico. This presence would help in establishing production facilities
161 Ford Motor Co.'s executive director of corporate strategy, Jack Eby, stated that opening
up the Mexican market-consisting of 90 million potential automobile customers-is the best
aspect of NAFrA. Automakers, Workers at Odds Over Trade Pact, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 13,
1992, at 52.
162 See Infrastructure Gets Mixed Reviews; Port Rail System Receives Low Grades, J. OF CoM.,
Dec. 3, 1992, at 6C.
163 See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text for discussion of the Mexican Automotive
Decree.
164 See supra note 157.
165 See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
166 Nissan and Volkswagen are the only foreign-owned automotive corporations that pres-
ently have production facilities in Mexico. See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text for a
description of the automotive industry in Mexico.
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to satisfy domestic content requirements, and serve as a foundation
from which to expand future operations.
American-owned automotive corporations must nonetheless
overcome certain obstacles in shifting their operations to Mexico.
First, they must work closely with the Mexican government to ease
tensions between the two countries and build a lasting relationship. 67
This will be greatly aided by the recent improved relations between
the two countries under the Salinas administration. 168
Second, American-owned automotive corporations must work
closely with the UAW to avoid potential strikes and negative public
reaction triggered by shifting American jobs to Mexico.169 American-
owned automotive corporations should strongly consider supporting
re-training programs to assist displaced automotive workers. These
programs would help to maintain a positive public image and help
avoid massive unemployment that would deplete consumer spending
power.
NAFTA's actual impact on automotive job displacement, how-
ever, may be limited. The anticipated growth in the Mexican economy
triggered by NAFTA, combined with the eventual elimination of tar-
iffs on automobile exports to Mexico which presently stand at 20 per-
cent,170 would lead to increased demand for American automotive
exports in Mexico. The Big Three would also become more competi-
tive with European and Asian automotive producers by operating in
an integrated North American automotive market.
Moreover, growth in the North American automotive parts in-
dustry would also dampen job displacement. Foreign-owned automo-
tive corporations would have to restructure their sourcing strategies
and align themselves with North American automotive parts suppliers
to satisfy NAFTA's domestic content requirement. 171 This restructur-
ing will clearly lead to an increase in demand for North American
automotive parts.
167 For a discussion of past negative relations between the United States and Mexico, see
supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
168 Id,
169 Union workers have been quick to condemn NAFrA in fear that it "will encourage the
flight of high-paying American jobs to Mexico with no corresponding benefits to U.S. workers or
consumers." ALF-CIO, Other Unions Blast Free Trade Pact as Prescription for U.S. Job Loss,
Int'l Trade Rep (BNA) (Aug. 13, 1992); see also Thomas R. Howard, Free Trade Between the
United States and Mexico: Minimizing the Adverse Effects on American Workers, 18 WM. MrrCH-
ELL L. Rlv. 507 (1992).
170 See supra notes 56-58.
171 See Chappell, supra note 60, at 35.
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While this increased demand would lead to price increases for
North American automotive parts,172 American-owned automotive
corporations would be less burdened than foreign-owned automotive
producers by such increases. American-owned automotive corpora-
tions tend to be more vertically integrated than are foreign-owned au-
tomotive corporations. 73  Thus, American-owned automotive
corporations are less dependent on outside automotive parts produ-
cers for their supply of automotive parts.
NAFTA's rule of origin requirement also poses several practical
concerns for the North American automotive industry. First, the trace
through method will undoubtedly lead to more administrative costs
and burdensome documentation requirements than CFTA's roll up
method. 74 The figures on which origin determinations are based are
generally held in the accounting records of the corporations that make
or process the components. These corporations, however, may not be
the importers of record, thus posing tracing and verification problems
where multiple manufacturing activities are involved.
Second, as with any value-based content requirement, fluctua-
tions in the currency exchange rates can drastically affect the outcome
of origin determinations. These fluctuations tend to occur during eco-
nomic turmoil, and may hinder automotive corporations when they
can least afford additional strain. While a content requirement that
focuses on a given component's weight of domestic material or limits
its inquiry to whether certain critical components are domestic 75
would avoid the currency fluctuation problem, these standards fail to
give adequate protection to the free trade area since they may be eas-
ily manipulated. A better rule would recognize the currency fluctua-
tion problem and provide a limited exception for severe currency
fluctuations.
Finally, it is yet to be determined whether the final version of
NAFTA's rule of origin requirement will be simple and unambiguous.
Considering the attention that the Honda case has drawn 176 and the
continued elimination of manipulative costs under NAFTA's two tier
172 See Automobiles: U.S. Car Makers Pleased With NAFTA; Japanese Makers Predict Higher
Costs, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) (Aug. 19, 1992).
173 See Rule of Origin Report, supra note 45; See also Doron P. Levin, G.M. to Shut Down 7
Parts Factories in Strategy Shift Will Buy From Suppliers, N.Y. TmFas, Dec. 4, 1992, at Al (not-
ing the extent of vertical integration at G.M.).
174 See Max Gates, Parts-tracing set for trade pact, AuTOMOTIVE NEws, Aug. 31, 1992, at 35.
175 See supra note 80 discussing the critical process requirement standard.
176 For a discussion of the Honda case see supra notes 14-18 and accompanying text.
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domestic content analysis, 77 it appears probable that the final version
of NAFrA's rule of origin will lead to more predictable custom
rulings.
V. CONCLUSION
If NAFTA is enacted, its rule of origin requirement would have a
significant effect on the North American automotive market. Existing
foreign-owned automotive corporations operating in Canada should
be able to satisfy NAFTA's content requirement without having to
incur substantial re-tooling costs. While NAFTA's content require-
ment would be twelve and one half percent higher than CFTA's con-
tent requirement, it would only be gradually introduced and would
provide certain protections for foreign-owned automotive producers
that are presently not included in CFTA.
NAFTA, however, would alter the existing American and Cana-
dian automotive market by including Mexico in the free trade agree-
ment. Automotive corporations, particularly those currently
operating in Canada, would attempt to shift their operations to Mex-
ico to take advantage of lower labor rates, to better serve Mexico's
growing automotive market, and to gain increased economies of scale;
while still being able to export duty-free to the United States under
NAFTA. North American-owned automotive producers would have a
considerable advantage over foreign-owned automotive producers, as
they already have established automotive plants in Mexico and will
not have to incur significant re-tooling costs to satisfy NAFTA's strin-
gent rule of origin requirement.
While this movement of operations to Mexico will result in some
American automotive job displacement, overall this displacement will
be limited. The anticipated improvement of the Mexican economy
and the elimination of tariffs under NAFTA should result in an in-
creased demand for American automotive exports. NAFTA should
enable North American automotive producers to operate more effi-
ciently and better compete with international competitors. Moreover,
increased demand for North American automotive parts from auto-
motive corporations attempting to meet NAFTA's increased rule of
origin requirement should dampen the effect of any job displacement.
As further revisions are made to NAFTA before its enactment,
there must be a continued effort to avoid trade deflection and to pro-
mote predictable custom rulings. While political pressures will un-
177 For a discussion of the two tier method see supra notes 103-16 and accompanying text.
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doubtedly figure into this process, it is imperative to keep the impact
of these pressures at a minimum to aid the North American automo-
tive industry in the new global market.
